REPORT

on the

ENTRAPMENT by FIRE

of

PAUL COLLIER

and

PETER COFFILL

in the

BAILEY SECTOR, WELLUMS CREEK FIRE

on the morning of December 9, 2002

by

PETER COFFILL

SUMMARY

On the morning of December 9, 2002, Peter Coffill and Paul Collier, volunteer fire fighters and members of Grose Vale Rural Fire Brigade, were trapped by fire when a backburn put in place by employees of The National Parks and Wildlife Service of NSW went horribly wrong, endangering the lives of the two volunteers in particular and the safety of the other crew members, MJ Jennison, Anne-Maree Cook and Peter McCann, brigade vehicles and equipment of The Hawkesbury Rural Fire District in the Baileys Sector of the Wellum Creek Fire. Twenty metre high flames engulfed both sides of the trail they were on and with their tanker being moved beyond their reach, the two members were forced to seek refuge, on foot, with no access to hoses, tanker or equipment, as flames, smoke and heated air swirled around them. Miraculously they survived due to common sense, experience, knowledge and an understanding of physics and fire behaviour, and remaining calm in the face of possible death.

INTRODUCTION

After changing over with the night time crew we were briefed by the Divcom for our task today. Overnight crews had completed a backburn along the east of the trail in Baileys Sector. We were to attend initially to an outbreak which had been water bombed the previous afternoon on the section of hand line, north from the track T-junction at the top of the hill. There were no crews from the National Parks and Wildlife Service of NSW present at the briefing although the IAP, on page 7, indicates they had 3 x Cat 9 units allocated to Baileys Sector today.

We arrived at the junction, GR144147 (IAP states junction at GR 144148 on page 2, yet at GR 146147 on page 5 and further, on the 'Refuges' page (page 12) puts it at 145146, although it is not clear whether this is the beginning of the hand tool line or the refuge area/helicopter landing site on the edge of the cliff line, 200 metres away to the north).

I accompanied the sector leader down to investigate the breakout mentioned in our briefing with the Divcom. It was at GR 143148 and, only metres to the north, at the extremity of the hand line, was a cliff line, approximately 80 metres high. This cliff line is not detailed on the map issued with the IAP. It was known to exist as the previous day's crews had made mention of it.

The map accompanying the IAP was totally inappropriate at a scale of approximately 1:66 000, hence covered too much area to be of use (see Fig 1.). We needed detail of the area 300m from the junction, yet didn't have it. It also did not show any creek down which we could put a hand tool line (as suggested in the 'Tasking Summary' sheet of that date), due to the scale, quality and obliteration of finer detail by the "proposed backburn" symbol. The legend of the map also shows the same symbols for "Control line complete" and "Active" (Active being not further described). Neither the power lines nor the service track on the ridge were shown on the map.

We returned to the tankers, with my GPS telling me it was 180 metres from the breakout. I instructed my crew to take 7 lengths of 25mm hose and head down the hand line to deal with the problem. Upon returning to the breakout area, MJ commented that she had heard a crackling noise coming from the west. Paul and I went to investigate whilst MJ and Anne-Maree blacked out the trunks and stumps.

We located an active fire of low intensity, moving slowly to the south on a front of approximately 30 metres. A radio call was placed to the sector leader advising of the fire at GR 143147, and requesting a water drop. A bucket dropped on the fire would have then allowed us to contain and extinguish the fire with the 25mm hose line we had in place. A message was returned shortly stating "no helicopters were allocated to the Bailey Sector today". This was contradictory to the IAP, page 3, which states "close containment by ground crews assited by helicopter support". ('assited' is as per document).

THE IAP

The "Tasking Summary" sheet (see appendix) issued for Monday 9/12/02 states the task for Baileys Sector "mop up and patrol, construct hand tool line from access track to Wellums Creek, down creek line. Consider strategy of burning from hand tool line or aerial suppression". However, according to the IAP, page 5, a task for this sector was "to extend the burn along the fire trail 300 metres to top of hand tool line GR 143145". Was this the hand tool line we were "to extend the burn to", which at the same time, we were to construct? It became apparent no-one was aware of this hand tool line and with the variety of grid references being shown for one intersection alone, it was assumed to be the line we had been working off. (It should be noted that the IAP pages 5 and 6 have a DTG of "06.12.1800, Updated No:12" yet the remainder of the plan DTG is "09.12.0200, Updated No:17"). Which task sheet did The National Parks and Wildlife Service of NSW crews receive? Page 7 of the IAP (Resources Personnel) shows 3 x Cat 9 NPWS to be in Baileys Sector, however page 6, under ‘Co-ordinating Instructions’ indicates they were “to proceed to Wat Buddha Dhamma via Commission Track”. Is this why they were not present at the briefing?

COMMUNICATIONS

Communication was a cause for concern. So often it was heard from Fire Control "please move location and try again". Often this is not possible, particularly if the tanker is involved in a burn over at the time. The IAP on page 9 indicates the Communication Unit and Fire Control to use GRN channel 181, yet the Medivac Plan, IAP page 13 indicated the Control Centre is monitoring GRN channel 183. Page 9 of the IAP also indicated the Communication Unit would be monitoring PMR, Simplex Channel 9 and GRN 181. It is not possible to monitor 3 channels as the vehicle only has two radios capable of this. The IAP, page 9 also indicated the Communication Unit would be monitoring NPWS #27, #24, and #39. It is currently fitted with one NPWS radio. The Communication Unit was also tasked to be at GR 145147 on that morning, which would indicate Planning had predicted the area to be of reasonably low fire activity as they had planned to put a non-fire fighting equipped vehicle at the intersection of concern, being at the top of the track.

THE SITUATION

The sector leader asked us to extinguish the fire that we had reported earlier in the morning. We moved Grose Vale 1 west along the trail, turning it around and located it in line with the eastern flank of the fire. We then proceeded to deal with the western flank, our escape not being cut off if the fire front came close to the track. Another unit dealt with the eastern flank. We had it well under control, flame height averaged one metre with occasional flares. A radio message came from my pump operator/driver, Peter McCann, that National Parks and Wildlife Service of NSW crews were about to light up the track and to move back out now. We had just made it to the track as National Parks and Wildlife Service of NSW crews, brandishing drip torches, were moving rapidly in both directions along the edge of the track saying the only way to stop this is to light up the track. I advised them we had the fire under control and almost contained They did not seek information as to fire behaviour, intensity or size and ignored the information that the fire was controllable by direct attack. They continued to light up, at times passing in front of the tanker to continue the burn. This action was against a requirement of the IAP which states on page 3, "Burning operations require specific IC approval" as permission was neither sought nor granted through Operations.

Their actions accelerated the advance of the fire front. This was predictable. What remained unpredictable were the actions of the National Parks and Wildlife Service of NSW crews in generating this situation. It was the National Parks and Wildlife Service of NSW crews who had placed my crew and other Rural Fire Service of NSW members in a totally unacceptable and dangerous position. It wasn't long before we had a spotover on the south side of the track. We dealt with this. Shortly after, a second and then a third. It was time to go. "Make up and let's go" I instructed my crew. Within moments the tanker moved off quickly, unexpectedly and without warning, dragging the bulk of our canvas lengths with it, the live reel unrolling as it went. I called for the tanker to stop as I noticed a hose being entwined around Paul's feet and shrinking into an ever-smaller circle. It stopped briefly but took off again. Luckily Paul got his feet out in time, otherwise he could have been dragged along at the rear of the tanker for quite some distance, suffering head, leg and other injuries. A wall of flames rapidly engulfed the track, now burning on both sides, isolating us from our tanker and cut off our escape route to safety. Flames, smoke and heat began to swirl around us. I realised Grose Vale 1 was of no further help to us and to ensure the safety of the remaining three crew members and the tanker I radioed instructions for the driver "to relocate immediately to the burnt area at the top of the trail. Go now, do not wait for us". I felt at this time it was better to lose two lives than to place the safety of the three others and the vehicle in jeopardy. Fire was bearing down on the tanker and it was moving fast. Loud voices were heard over the roar of the fire.

(I later learned that the National Parks and Wildlife Service of NSW crews had their vehicles blocking the track, not facing the exit direction, consequently preventing the Rural Fire Service of NSW crews from getting their vehicles out, causing them to activate the tanker protection spray system on three occasions before reaching the safe area.. I also later learnt that it was not one of my crew who moved our tanker away from us so rapidly).

I knew the experience I had gained over 15 years as a member of Grose Vale Rural Fire Brigade would now be put to the test. I completed my Basic Training Course in 1988, been a Deputy Captain since 1993 and qualified as a crew leader in 1996. I suddenly had the responsibility for Paul, one of our younger members, his life and well being, thrust upon me in circumstances many of us would rather not have. Whether we survived or whether we perished in a ball of flames rested entirely in my hands. Paul remained calm throughout the ordeal; he is to be congratulated for that, and showed confidence and trust in me to get both of us out alive. I couldn't let him down and being the crew leader, it was my job to get us both out safely as the tree tops around us exploded into flames reaching up to 20 metres. Besides, I had promised our communications callout officer I would be available to take the communications vehicle to St Albans tomorrow.

A human instinct of fight or flight had to be overcome. We had nothing to fight with as our tanker, water, hoses and all equipment had been whisked away from us; to flee would have resulted in us passing through walls of flames, exiting at the tankers after suffering major trauma and burns, a condition we would not have survived. It was at least 200m to the known refuge area. It was easy to understand, given the situation of despair that most people would feel themselves in, which they would probably take that option knowing that their tanker and remainder of crew were in that direction. For us, it was not going to be an option.

If we couldn't outpace the fire, we had to outsmart it. Flames can't think but humans can. Fires will normally flare at track edges due to unobstructed availability of oxygen. This was happening and I knew the tanker was not coming back. It now became necessary to adopt survival techniques on the fireground in the midst of an inferno, which by now had spread to surround us, a full 360 of fire, flames, heat and smoke. We moved continuously to prevent direct impingement by flames, seeking out small pockets of lower intensity burning fuels as the fire slowly consumed all around us.

The fire behaviour had become erratic yet remained reasonably predictable. Moving onto the (just) burnt ground provided no relief as it was actually hotter than other areas. We moved, the body seeking and the brain sensing out the differences in temperatures that would give us a tolerable level of pain. As the entire bush was eventually consumed the only choice was to drop face down onto the track, the larger sized fuel now making the radiant heat more intense. Our overalls became too hot to touch, as if they were being ironed, and your skin, below, the ironing board. To raise a leg, bent back at the knee was intolerable yet flat on the ground was bearable....a difference of less than 30cm made a difference to exposure, hence comfort. Elbows on the ground felt as if immersed in boiling water. We hoped a vehicle would not come along the track, not being able to see us in the smoke as we lay motionless on the ground in an attempt to keep internal heat production to an absolute minimum. The ground felt like a barbecue plate under which someone had lit the gas.

A message came over the fireground radio I was carrying, which up to now had been silent. I could sense some trepidation and a slight quiver in the voice... "Grose Vale Leader, this is Baileys Leader". I suspected the sector leader wasn't sure whether he would receive an answer to his call and at that stage I felt he was probably thinking "I hope they are alive, I hope they answer, please answer me".

I replied that "we were both O.K., it's quite hot in here, but at the moment we are both fine. We will wait it out".

He asked "do you want a tanker to come in to help you" to which I replied "negative, it would be too dangerous to send one in, but thank you for asking".

THE OUTCOME

Time passed, the smoke had cleared a little, it was time to go. The first attempt was aborted due to the intense radiant heat and smoke blocking our exit further along the track. Shortly after, we made a second attempt. We came across hoses burning on the edge of the track. "How am I going to explain this to my Captain" I thought as I leant down to cut off the fittings? Green paint! You beauty, for our colours are yellow and orange; I was joyful for they were not ours! We had survived; we should have perished. As we walked on we noticed the leaf litter was gone from the track; nothing remained or so we thought...... a small silver lizard scurried across in front of us.....it too, had survived.

We exited from the thinning smoke to rejoin our other crew members who were waiting anxiously at the tanker, ever hopeful that we would survive. Paul was hot; his face very red. The crew poured water over him until his overalls were soaked. A member of another brigade commented to Paul that "you have just had ten years of experience in 30 minutes". Indeed, he had. After cooling down for a while at the tanker, I walked back along the track with Anne-Maree, in search of her phone, which had fallen from the vehicle during the incident. It was not found. It had been consumed without a trace, just like everything else along the track The next day, Paul was back on the tanker and I took the communications vehicle to St Albans. It rained all day.

CONCLUSION

The fact that neither of us suffered burns or injuries would have some people believe "the situation couldn't have been as bad as all that as they came out unhurt"........it was that bad, but only tactics and strategy for survival prevented injury or death.

The situation was, to a large extent, generated by inadequacy of maps, which failed to show sufficient detail. and inconsistencies within the IAP, leading to a conflict in proposed strategies for the Baileys Sector on that day. Absence of air support, although proposed in the IAP contributed to the situation. Any operation involving fire has the potential to kill and no matter what level of activity, from low key hazard reduction to "patrol and mop-up" to direct attack on a fire front. None of them should be taken any differently from any other. Today started as a day of "patrol and mop-up". It did not end that way.

Care needs to be exercised when working with National Parks and Wildlife Service of NSW crews...their techniques, tactics and training are different to those used by the Rural Fire Service of NSW. Their fireground radios also operate on a different frequency to those used by the Rural Fire Service of NSW. Fire management appears to come before consideration of human life. Within a blink of an eye, National Parks and Wildlife Service of NSW crews placed my crew members and those of other brigades in a dangerous and totally unacceptable life-threatening situation.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Sector leaders should have ground to air facility for use in emergencies.

All units in a sector should have a common radio channel - i.e., Rural Fire Service of NSW and National Parks and Wildlife Service of NSW.

Refuge areas should be shown on a map as per Standard Mapping Symbols Chart, not as a table of grid references, which are not visually available when needed.

IAP to include a copy of original maps for the specific area at 1:25 000...not created, not pasted from files, not overlays.....avoids human error at this stage.

IAP to include an enlarged section of the map if the sector tasks concern areas where trails and track junctions are within the 100 metre "error zone" of 6 figure Grid References.

IAP to be checked for accuracy and/or inconsistency prior to issue.

More use should be made of the accuracy of GPS receivers and mapping programs that do not alter the display of a topographical map.